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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The interests of the amici are contained within the motion to file 
amicus curiae brief. 
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS 
 
I. Whether Padilla v. Kentucky substantially changed law in 
Washington State. 
 
II. As Padilla v. Kentucky did not announce a new rule, whether it 
should apply retroactively. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
This brief relies upon the appellant’s statement of the case. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Much is at stake when noncitizen defendants accept guilty pleas in 
Washington courts. Given that deportation has become a virtually 
automatic consequence for a broad range of convictions, failure to provide 
effective assistance of counsel can, and often does, result in a devastating 
blow that tears noncitizens away from “all that makes life worth living.” 
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Deportation inflicts grave 
emotional and financial harm on families, especially dependent U.S. 
citizen children. See Jonathan Baum et. al, In the Child’s Best Interest? 
The Consequences of Losing a Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation, 
4-5 (2010).
1
 In 2009, Washington State children residing with at least one 
                                                          
1
 Immigration authorities removed 46,486 parents of U.S. citizen children from the 
U.S. in the six month period between January and June 2011 alone. 
2 
 
noncitizen parent accounted for 25.2% of the population under 18.
2
 In 
addition, our society as a whole bears the costs for these family 
separations because dependent spouses and children of deportees must 
rely on public assistance and other forms of governmental support to 
survive. Baum, supra, at 5-6.  
Given what is at stake for so many, and in light of the arguments 
herein, Amici request this court to reconsider its decision in the instant 
case or, in the alternative, withdraw its precedential designation. Had this 
Court had the requisite briefing from Mr. Gomez’ appellate counsel 
warranted by the complex issues presented, Amici believes the Court 
could and would have reached a different conclusion.
 3
  
ARGUMENT 
I. PADILLA SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THE LAW IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
 
                                                          
2
 This and other significant demographic data regarding Washington State’s immigrant 
population are available at the Migration Policy Institute’s Data Hub:      
www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=WA#1. 
3
 In this case, the superior court ruled that it could not consider Gomez’s motion to 
vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance because it had previously vacated 
the conviction under RCW 9.94A.640, based on the passage of time and good behavior. 
Gomez’s appellate briefing focused solely on that issue, and this Court correctly held that 
the trial court erred in that regard. The State, however, brought up additional issues on 
appeal regarding timeliness and retroactivity, which Gomez failed to address at 
all. (Gomez did address those issues in his superior court briefing but the superior court 
did not reach them). As discussed in this brief, those issues are hardly as one-sided as the 
State’s briefing would suggest, and in fact Amici maintain that they should be resolved in 
Gomez’s favor. However, the Court may find it more prudent to simply remove that 
portion of its decision and remand to the superior court to consider timeliness and 
retroactivity in the first instance. If the superior court’s ruling is appealed again, this 
Court can then address the issues based on a complete record, and more thorough 
briefing.       
 
3 
 
In reaching its decision in the instant case this Court relied upon the 
State’s incorrect analysis to find that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, --- U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) does not qualify 
Mr. Gomez for an exception to the 1 year filing requirement for post-
conviction relief motions because the decision does not constitute a 
substantial change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6). While the State 
got the test right for what constitutes a substantial change in law, it clearly 
missed the mark in applying it to this case and this Court’s reliance on that 
misguided analysis was misplaced.
4
 Gomez at 6, citing Br. Of Resp’t at 9-
10. In light of the consequences to the many noncitizens and their families 
who now unjustly face the severe penalty of deportation, Amici request 
the Court to correct its error.  
As the State articulated, the test for whether a new legal decision 
constitutes a substantial change in law under RCW 10.73.100(6), is to 
determine whether the defendant could have argued this issue before 
publication of the new decision. State v. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn.App. 313, 
321 (1997). A brief review of Washington case law makes clear that, prior 
to the Padilla decision, neither Mr. Gomez nor any noncitizen defendant 
whose defense counsel failed to address the risk of deportation in the 
course of representation could have availed themselves of the established 
ineffective assistance of counsel test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984).  
                                                          
4
 Again, Amici recognizes the failure of Mr. Gomez’ appellate counsel to provide the 
Court with briefing on the relevant issues. 
4 
 
There is no dispute that the Stickland test is well established. Gomez at 
6 (“Padilla…applied existing settled law to the case facts”). However, 
prior to Padilla, it was equally well-established in Washington law for 
over 26 years that Strickland’s test did not apply to immigration-related 
ineffective assistance claims. Since 1984 immigration-related ineffective 
assistance claims were deemed “collateral” to the criminal conviction and 
thus, outside the scope of counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties. See State v. 
Malik, 37 Wn.App. 414, 416, review denied 102 Wn.2d 1023 (1984) 
(Denying petitioners ineffective assistance claim on the grounds that “the 
possibility of deportation, being collateral, was not properly a concern of 
appointed counsel.”); State v. Holley, 75 Wn.App. 191, 197 (1994) 
(“[D]eportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction. Thus 
the trial court is not required to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
when a defendant shows that his counsel failed to warn him of the 
immigration consequences of a conviction.”); State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 
Wn. App. 869, 878 (2000) (“Deportation remains a collateral 
consequence. Thus, the trial court was not required to grant Mr. Martinez-
Lazo's motion to withdraw his plea.”); State v. Jamison, 105 Wn.App. 
572, 593 (2001) (Defense counsel’s performance regarding immigration 
consequences was “immaterial because deportation and exclusion from 
reentry are collateral consequences of Jamison’s guilty plea, not part of his 
punishment.”) 
5 
 
Thus, prior to Padilla, no decision in Washington permitted a post-
conviction motion premised on an immigration-related claim of ineffective 
assistance.
5
  
In order to apply Strickland to Mr. Padilla’s claim the High Court first 
had to make clear that immigration consequences were squarely within the 
ambit of defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 
1481. The Padilla Court itself recognized that by applying Strickland to 
Mr. Padilla’s case it was creating a substantial change in states like 
Washington that had relied upon the collateral consequences doctrine to 
foreclose immigration-related ineffective assistance claims. Id. After first 
noting that it had never applied the collateral consequences doctrine to 
define defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties, and noting its long 
recognition of deportation as a “particularly severe ‘penalty’”, the Court 
held: 
The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a 
Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude 
that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the 
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to 
Padilla's claim. Id. 
In its subsequent decision in State v. Sandoval, the Washington 
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that Padilla had overruled 
Washington law on this issue. State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163, 170, n.1 
(2011) (“Padilla has superseded Yim’s analysis of how counsel’s advice 
                                                          
5
 In In Re Yim, the Washington Supreme Court, in dicta, left open the limited 
possibility that affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences “might 
constitute a ‘manifest injustice’”. In Re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 589 (1999) No Washington 
court had ever published a decision so holding.  
 
6 
 
about deportation consequences (or lack thereof) affects the validity of a 
guilty plea.”). 
II. PADILLA DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE AND, 
THUS, APPLIES RETROACTIVELY 
 
While it is clear that Padilla effected a significant change in 
Washington law, it is equally clear that Padilla’s application of the 
Strickland test to immigration-related ineffective assistance claims did not 
forge a new federal constitutional rule and, thus, applies retroactively. 
Although these positions may at first blush seem incompatible, a review of 
the case law reveals that they are, in fact, aligned. Acknowledging both is 
necessary to ensure justice for noncitizen defendants and their families. 
Washington courts have generally followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
standards, as set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-300  reh’g 
denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). Teague generally prohibits a federal court 
from applying a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure 
retroactively.6       
Since state and federal courts have disagreed on whether Padilla 
announced a new rule it is most useful to look directly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s standards regarding retroactivity, and the discussion in 
Padilla itself regarding whether the Court believed it was breaking new 
                                                          
6
 The Washington Supreme Court has noted, however, that it is not bound by the 
Teague standard when deciding, under RCW 10.73.100 (6), whether a ruling should 
apply retroactively. State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 449, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 983 
(2005) (“Limiting a state statute on the basis of the federal court’s caution in interfering 
with State’s self-governance would be, at least, peculiar.”); In re Pers. Restraint of 
Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262 (2005) (Teague doctrine does not “define the full scope of RCW 
10.73.100(6).”). 
7 
 
ground.7 
“[T]he standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is 
‘objective,’ and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not 
necessarily mean a rule is new.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 
(2000) (citation omitted). Further,  
[i]f the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-
case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of 
specific applications without saying that those applications themselves 
create a new rule. . . . Where the beginning point is a rule of this general 
application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad 
of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so 
novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent. 
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
Strickland’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a general one 
that applies to a broad range of factual scenarios. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
566 U.S. 111, reh’g denied by In re Word, -- U.S. -- , 129 S.Ct. 2422 
(2009). The generality of the rule, however, “obviates neither the clarity of 
the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as ‘established’ by 
this Court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. See also, Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1068 (2007) (“Each time that a 
court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense 
attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation…it can 
hardly be thought to have created a new principle of constitutional law”).  
                                                          
7
 Several courts have followed this approach in concluding that Padilla applies 
retroactively. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892 (2011); 
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3rd Cir. 2011); People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 
365, 377-78 (Ill. App. 2011); Denisyuk v. State, -- A.3d --, 2011 WL 5042332 at *8-9 
(Md. 2011); Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 568-71 (Minn. App. 2011), State v. 
Ramirez, __ P.3d __(N.M. Ct. App. April 16, 2012); But see Chaidez v. United States, 
655 F.3d 684 (7
th
 Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-820 (Dec. 23, 2011).  
8 
 
In applying the Strickland standard to Padilla’s claim, the language of 
the opinion itself shows that the Justices did not believe they were creating 
a new rule. The Court noted that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), it 
established that Strickland’s requirement of effective assistance of counsel 
applied to advice regarding a plea offer. Padilla, at 1484. “Whether 
Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from Hill.” Id. at 1485, n.12.           
In holding that defense counsel has an affirmative duty to advise 
noncitizen defendants regarding immigration consequences, the Court 
rejected the notion that it was imposing some new burden on defense 
counsel. “For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally 
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation 
consequences of a client’s plea.” Id. at 1485.8  
Further, Padilla itself involved a collateral attack on a guilty plea. Id. 
at 1478. If the Court believed it was creating a new rule, it would not have 
applied that rule to Mr. Padilla. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 
(1989) (“Under Teague new rules will not be applied or announced in 
cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions.”). 
This fact alone warrants concluding that Padilla did not announce a new 
rule. See People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. App. 2011). 
                                                          
8
 In light of the procedural posture of the instant case, the issue of what were prevailing 
professional norms at the time of Mr. Gomez’ plea and sentence are not presently before 
the Court. However, Amici note that evidence supports that the prevailing norms 
referenced and relied upon in Padilla existed prior to 1995. See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton 
& Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 425, 445 
(1986); ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, 14-3.2 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 
1986) (instructing defense counsel to advise clients about collateral consequences of 
guilty plea, including deportation.) 
9 
 
One week after deciding Padilla, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in a collateral challenge similar to Padilla’s. The Court, vacated the 
judgment and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in 
view of Padilla. Santos-Sanchez v. United States, -- U.S. -- , 130 S.Ct. 
2340 (2010). The Court would not have issued such an order unless it 
thought that Padilla applies retroactively since the Court will issue such 
an order only when it believes an intervening decision would alter the 
lower court’s ruling.9 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996). 
The core premise of Padilla reiterates what Strickland held more than 
25 years ago: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Padilla at 
1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). In the recent decision in State v. Chetty, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 
987779 (2012) the State opposed defendant’s motion for additional time to 
file an appeal of his 2004 conviction which he asserted was premised on 
immigration-related ineffective assistance, on the grounds that Padilla was 
not retroactive. In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing the 
Division One Court stated:       
However, here, the question is not whether Padilla is retroactive but, 
rather, whether the professional norms in 2004 required defense counsel to 
advise Chetty about the deportation consequences of the conviction and 
the advantages and disadvantages of filing an appeal. 
                                                          
9
 The Fifth Circuit reversed its original decision in light of Padilla. Santos-Sanchez v. 
United States, 381 Fed. Appx. 419, 2010 WL 2465080 (2010). 
10 
 
Chetty, at 14. Given what is a stake, Mr. Gomez, and others like him, 
deserve their day in court to determine whether their representation met 
existing professional norms.  
CONCLUSION 
Subjecting noncitizens across the state who entered pleas prior to 
March 31, 2010, and their families, to the devastating consequences of 
deportation that will result from this decision is unwarranted and unjust. 
Amici request this court to reconsider.       
Respectfully submitted this 20
th
 day of April 2012, 
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